Can falsity be used to prove the scientific nature of religious propositions? With the advent of rational positivism in the early twentieth century and its spread throughout the world, metaphysics and even transcendent ethics were discredited. By breaking with the authority of positivism, which generalized the empirical and inductive criterion for distinguishing science from non-science and turned it into a general criterion for meaning, Popper opened a new arena for metaphysical discussions in which metaphysical theory is considered rational. Respecting metaphysical theory, Popper not only saw metaphysics as inseparable from science, but more importantly, that metaphysics was one of the hallmarks of testable scientific theories. In this sphere, this research with analytical-critical method, seeks to measure and study the impact of Popper's philosophy of science on religious knowledge. To this end, we first examine Popper's philosophy of science and conclude that, despite the objections to Popper's philosophy of science, falsity has not only provided a suitable platform for the rational justification of religious propositions; Rather, it was found that some religious teachings, especially those teachings that are proven by rational reasoning, have the ability to be refuted and can be considered on the basis of scientific refutation.